Students are expected to have a solid background in Microeconomics and Mathematical Economics
At the end of the course students will acquire the tools of the trade for theoretical research in the economics of information and its applications. Students will be able to understand models explicitly dealing with strategic behavior, information transmission, and contracting in economics and other business disciplines. Students will also learn to analyze and compare optimal contracts under different informational problems. Specifically, they will be familiar with topics involving private and asymmetric information, adverse selection, moral hazard, signaling and screening, as well as incentive mechanisms such as auctions and tournaments.
Risk and Uncertainty. Adverse Selection. Moral Hazard. Signaling. Auctions.
Written exam consisting of open questions and exercises, possibly integrated by multiple choice questions.
If the course is delivered remotely (totally or partially), changes may
occur in the program and/or in the exam, in order to adapt the course to on-line teaching methods.